Iran Strikes: Netanyahu Seeks Military Freedom Amid Political Stalemate

The recent Israeli elections have left Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a precarious political position, yet the resulting deadlock may grant him unexpected military latitude. His bloc holds a minority of seats, ensuring that new elections are unavoidable unless a deal is struck with Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the Yashar party. This stalemate creates a narrow window where strategic decisions regarding Iran can proceed before the political machinery grinds to a halt.

Netanyahu had seriously considered resuming the conflict with Iran in recent weeks. Two factors previously held him back: opposition from US President Donald Trump and resistance from IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir. Trump’s objection was tied to the timing of the US midterm elections on November 3, while Zamir opposed an attack before the Israeli vote was cast. With the elections now concluded, both temporal obstacles have been removed.

The path to a new government remains blocked. Avigdor Liberman, the leader of the Yisrael Beytenu party and an ally of Eisenkot, will not begin serious coalition talks until Friday, when final vote results are tallied. Liberman faces a difficult choice: form a government with the Israeli-Arab parties, strike a deal with Netanyahu, or trigger a second round of elections. Even if he selects a path, the negotiations required to distribute ministries and define policy commitments typically take weeks or months.

This timeline extends well beyond the four days remaining until the US midterm elections. Consequently, Netanyahu is likely to have the freedom to strike Tehran if Trump agrees or remains passive. Zamir’s previous hesitation was specific to the pre-election period. He opposed an attack to prevent Iranian ballistic missile counterstrikes from disrupting voting and to avoid the perception that a strike was designed to boost Netanyahu’s electoral chances.

Zamir supports an attack under two conditions: Iran must be on the verge of striking Israel, or the US must initiate the conflict and provide full offensive and defensive backing. His general instinct is to strike if Iran rapidly recovers its threat capabilities or if a well-considered strategy can push Tehran into key nuclear concessions. He views a post-election strike as less politically fraught than one conducted immediately before a vote.

The primary obstacle now rests with Trump. The president did not want to enter a conflict leading into the midterms because the ongoing Iran war is dragging down his and the Republican Party’s poll numbers. However, after November 3, Trump will be unable to run for a third term and may feel less constrained. His top advisers are mostly against a return to war, arguing that Iran’s refusal to crack since February suggests a few more days of intense fighting will not yield a breakthrough.

Advisers also warn that Tehran has shown a willingness to keep firing after a ceasefire, potentially extending the conflict beyond a few days. This risk could lead Trump to abandon the high price tag of another round of combat in favor of a long-term economic pressure campaign. This strategy of oscillating between economic pressure and sudden threats has been employed in August and October, a pattern that may have weakened the credibility of his threats in the eyes of Iranian officials.

An alternative scenario involves Iran offering a substantive nuclear deal in response to the latest threat of force, which would delay any attack. If Trump does favor striking, the timing is advantageous for Netanyahu. Attacking Iran while holding a Jewish majority in the vote count and while Eisenkot’s camp struggles to rally could refocus the national conversation on the conflict. This shift might make it harder for Eisenkot to negotiate with Israeli-Arab parties amid incoming ballistic missiles or easier to accept a deal with Netanyahu if the war pushes domestic issues like the October 7 aftermath to the background.

Netanyahu’s main challenge will be justifying the attack. He cannot simultaneously claim he has removed the nuclear and ballistic missile threat and then argue that time is running out for a new strike. Until Tehran makes new nuclear concessions, an attack could be justified theoretically, and many Israelis would support joining a US effort to "clean house" rather than fighting alone later. However, with Zamir in no rush, Netanyahu must provide more than vague statements about Iranian progress to secure public legitimacy for a third round of conflict.